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ABSTRACT 
In 5G technology, huge number of connected devices are needed to be 
considered where the expected throughput is also very ambitious. Capacity is 
needed and thus used frequencies are expected to get higher (above 6 GHz even 
up to 80 GHz), the Cell size getting smaller and number of cells arising 
significantly. Therefore, it is expected that wireless backhaul will be one option 
for Network operators to deliver capacity and coverage for high subscriber 
density areas with reduced cost. Wireless backhaul optimization, performance 
and scalability will be on the critical path on such cellular system.  This master’s 
thesis work includes connecting a base station by using the wireless backhaul by 
introducing a VPN in the proposed network. We find the bottleneck and its 
solution. The network is using 3.5 GHz wireless link instead of LAN wire for 
backhaul link between the EnodeB and the core network (OpenEPC). LTE 
TDD band 42 acting as a Wireless Backhaul (Link between EnodeB and Band 
42 CPE Router). The status and attachment procedure are observed from 
different nodes of the openEPC and from the VPN machine. Step by step we 
have established a tunnel between the CPE device and the VPN server using 
PPTP and L2TP with IPSec tunneling protocol. The progression towards the 
final implementation brings in step by step all difficulties and bottlenecks are 
documented in the study.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cellular mobile and data communication system are expanding rapidly for the 
demand of more coverage and capacity. The use of high speed internet is a 
requirement for many applications such as when online gaming requires high data 
rate and lower latency to achieve real time experience. This growing need of capacity 
can be fulfilled using higher frequency bands; inevitably the cell size would be 
significantly smaller and number of cells will arise consequently. The 
communicating base stations are linked to one to another and to the core network 
using wireless backhaul. Thus, wireless backhaul is one of the major concern for 
future 5G cellular communication. In this thesis we have proposed a design/topology 
to provide improved data rate and capacity for distant users. In the network the pico 
and Macro base stations are connected to virtual core ‘OpenEPC1’ at the premises of 
University of Oulu. We have performed tests at different points over the network for 
throughput and latency measurement. The thesis will go through the details step by 
step. 
 
1.1. 5G Test Network, University of Oulu 
5GTN is a joint effort from industry, academia and Finnish Govt. with globally 
recognized companies such as Nokia, Huawei, Ericsson, Coriant and intel and also 
internationally recognized research organizations like VTT, University of Helsinki, 
University of Oulu, Tampere University of Technology and Aalto University. 5GTN 
is a part of the project 5GTNF which is funded by Tekes-the Finnish funding agency 
for innovation aimed to research, business development and innovation purposes. It 
is the joint collaboration of the research teams both academic and industry to 
facilitate national and international collaboration in research and development for 
future 5G technology.  
5GTN2 have already built a fully functional LTE network with all necessary 
infrastructure to use it as a 5G proof of concept testbed for future 5G cellular 
network. 
5GTN has a complete network infrastructure where some network functions are 
shared, maintained and managed for the fully functional LTE network, which is a 
step ahead towards 5G. The 5GTN testbed is also connected with Oulu University 
hospital which is a few kilometers away from university premises for medical IOT 
solutions and used cases. A more detailed information about the 5GTN testbed is 
shown in figure 1:  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 OpenEPC by CND; Details available at http://www.openepc.com/home/overview/ 
2 5G Test Network; Available at http://5gtn.fi/ 
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Figure 1. 5G Test Network Architecture [1]. 
 
5GTN is currently using 2.6GHz (LTE Band 7) for the FDD pico cells and 
3.5GHz (LTE Band 42) for the TDD Macro base station. The band 3.5 GHz (3.4-3.6 
GHz) is supposed to be used only in the university premises for research purposes as 
it is commercially unlicensed. A number of Pico and Macro cells are installed and 
commissioned in the university premises, allocating the configuration of the MME 
according to the control and data plane of respective core network. Thus a 
mobile/end device knows to which core network it needs to connect. There are three 
different core networks which is shown in figure 1. OpenEPC is a virtual core 
network deployed at University of Oulu IT servers, where it is running on VMWare 
ESXi vSphere environment. The nodes of OpenEPC such as MME, HSS, EnodeB, 
SPGW and EPC-enablers are installed and running in virtual machines. A VPN 
server is installed in another virtual machine ‘vpn5g’ along with other VM’s. The 
VPN server is used to establish an IP security tunneling between the server and the 
CPE device. 
The second core network is a shared resource network (SRN) core, situated in 
Tampere, Finland owned by Nokia. It is connected to the 5GTN network via VPN 
over internet. Lastly we have Nokia EPC at the vLAN 999 at the university premises, 
which is on the way to installation. OpenEPC is a virtual LTE network designed by 
Core Network Dynamics (CND). Users are provisioned with unique IMSI and CND 
test SIM card. It is deployed in the cloud environment, in the servers of university of 
Oulu and can be accessed remotely from the network of university of Oulu i.e ‘Univ 
domain’. 5GTN can be used as a testbed for the integration of devices and built 
infrastructure for both 3gpp and non 3gpp cases. The testbed has successfully 
integrated base stations and gateways to access and collect data from different IOT 
sensors3 [1]. 
                                                 
3 5G Test Network project page available at http://5gtn.fi 
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Figure 2. Pico Base stations connected via CPE device 
 
 
1.2. Aims and Objective 
The scope and motivation for this thesis is how wireless backhaul implementation 
and observation of the herein used case. A closed observation on the performance 
evaluation based on throughput and delay analysis is implemented in the network. 
An important outcome of the work demonstrates the easy and hustle free plug and 
play installation of the small cells. These small cell implementation enables mobility. 
For example, if we need to give coverage and capacity to some low coverage place, 
the small cells (Pico base station) can be easily carried with the CPE device to the 
desired location and can be connected with the core network. Thus, we can achieve 
high coverage and capacity in the network. Implementation of small cells and trails 
are demonstrably performed to see the outcome performance of the small cells. In the 
above figure multiple base stations can be connected via CPE device. CPE device 
connects to the nearest TDD base station which is connected to the core network. In 
the configuration of pico cells, the specific IP address of the HSS of specific core 
network is provided so that the users can be authenticated getting access from that 
specific core network. In this case the S1 connectivity established via Wireless 
backhaul. In the Pico base station configuration, we have changed the MME IP to the 
IP address of the OpenEPC MME changing the PLMN accordingly. Thus, any user 
using the OpenEPC SIM card can be authenticated from the core network and get 
connected. 
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1.3. Thesis Structure 
In thesis writing we have presented the related theories with the corresponding works 
compiled in a step by step approach to make it more understandable for the new 
readers. In Chapter 1 a brief overview is narrated to understand the present network 
scenario of the testbed. Chapter 2 describes the basic information of wireless 
backhaul in cellular systems. Chapter 3 describes the tunneling protocols and their 
working mechanism including the related theories. We have discussed the protocols 
of our interest. Chapter 4 describes the implementation of security tunneling in 
different platform archived step by step. We have implemented by starting with some 
test configurations and gradually step by step implemented our required setups on 
every step, we have documented all related literatures. The thesis is written as a 
compiled journal describing setup architecture and bottlenecks for the better 
understanding for the new readers that be. 
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2. WIRELESS BACKHAUL 
Wireless backhaul is the wireless communication or network infrastructure 
responsible for transporting data/traffic from end user to the central network 
infrastructure and vice versa. The backhaul is expected to play a critical role in 
handling huge data traffic, capability driven by the growing demand from both 
mobile broadband and deployment of heterogeneous networks. (HetNets) [2]. The 
simplified network architecture can be split into Air interface, Radio Access Network 
and core network. The link between the Radio Access network and the Core network 
is referred to as backhaul. Generally, for GSM networks these backhaul links are 
E1and T1 links which are used to carry low data rates. The E1 and T1 can carry 
2Mbps and 1.5 Mbps respectively. 
 
2.1. Existing Wireless Backhaul Technology 
From 3G to beyond towards 5G it is an essential requirement to have high data rate 
support from the backhaul. There are many different backhaul types and sub 
categories that are needless to mention here. Only the major backhaul types are listed 
below: 
• Wired 
- Optical (Fiber) 
- (A)DSL 
• Wireless 
- Microwave (10-42 GHz) 
- V Band/60 GHz (57-64 GHz) 
- E-Band (71-76, 81-86 GHz) 
• Satellite 
• Wi-Fi Mesh 
• LTE Backhaul 
• TD-LTE Backhaul 
• Self-backhauling 
• Optical 
-Laser 
 
In case of wired backhaul, the most popular type is fiber backhaul which is mainly 
used in 4G networks. For more high data rate Optical backhauling is needed. Coaxial 
cables and Ethernet cables are used for backhauling in 3G networks. Speaking of 
microwave frequencies microwave plays a vital role in wireless backhaul. It is hard 
to deploy cable connection in difficult terrain and environment conditions. 
Microwave frequencies are preferable and practical so there is traditional 10 to 42 
GHz microwave link. Then there is V band which is 57 to 64 GHz frequency, which 
is generally referred to as 60 GHz band. There is also the E band 71 to 76 GHz and 
81 to 86 GHz band. These ITU band names are different from the 3GPP band names. 
In future 5G communication network multiple layers of frequencies are needed to 
provide a good and efficient network. For example, 1 to 6 GHz can be used to 
provide capacity and for higher throughput 6 to 100 GHz can be utilized. Satellite 
backhauls are especially used for rural and remote locations. Traditional backhaul 
 
 
14 
technology cannot reach such areas thus satellite backhaul plays the vital role in 
communicating remote locations. LTE backhaul can be used in “in Band” or “Out of 
Band” approach. TD LTE backhaul can be deployed for improved coverage and 
capacity. In 5G it is expected that there would be dense deployment so only fiber 
cannot connect each and every base station. For example, there might be some 
situation when one base station connected to fiber and thereby it connects three or 
four base stations by self-backhauling. Optical backhauling can be an expensive 
solution which uses point to point connectivity and LOS which has the capacity of 
high throughput4. 
 
2.2. Requirements of wireless backhaul in cellular network 
The backhaul technology is the infrastructure that is responsible to connect small 
networks to the backbone or the primary network. Small cells/ Pico cells can be 
connected to the donor base station i.e. Macro Cell through wireless backhaul as 
illustrated as in the figure below:  
 
 
Figure 3. Wireless Backhaul in heterogeneous network. 
 
The wired solution may provide high reliability, high capacity, high speed but 
wireless backhaul is preferable as it offers easy deployment and economical solution. 
However, to choose a wireless backhaul solution in a heterogeneous network 
depends on some system considerations, such as network capacity, small cell density, 
electromagnetic interference, data rate requirement etc, which must be ensured 
                                                 
4 3G 4G Wireless Resource Centre; Available at http://3g4g.co.uk/ 
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maintaining a low power consumption and availability of orthogonal backhaul 
spectrum. Thus, in a heterogeneous network having both Micro cells and small cells 
forward huge traffic to the core network can be a critical issue. Wireless backhaul 
demands high throughput and low latency, which is the challenge of future 5G 
cellular communication. LS-MIMO is going to be deployed for which high 
performance interference mitigation capacity is required. The small cells are 
deployed and increasing in density for which Energy Efficient technique such as 
beamforming can be deployed to reduce the power consumption of the wireless 
backhaul [3]. 
 
2.3. Bottlenecks of implementation 
 
Figure 4. Implementation Setup 
 
In simplest form our implementation is presented in the above figure. In the 
network the CPE device is placed amidst two base stations where TDD base station 
already has S1 connection with the OpenEPC. To connect pico base station, it needs 
to establish a S1 connection with the MME. It is one of the hindrance of this 
arrangement because we cannot pass one S1 through another S1. To overcome this 
problem, we have introduced a VPN server, which is connected to the OpenEPC. 
The CPE device running in tunneling mode enables the pico base station to make S1 
connection to the core network. The CPE device and the TDD base station both 
operating at 3.5 GHz, have wireless backhaul connection between them. In the above 
figure the dotted line represents L2TP/IPSec tunneling. The tunneling starts at the 
client CPE device and ends at the end of the tunnel i.e server. The VPN server is 
running in a virtual machine “vpn5g”.  In our system we have used Openswan 
L2TP/IPSec VPN server to serve our purpose. The VPN server is connected to 
PanOulu. On the other hand, the nodes of OpenEPC are also connected to PanOulu 
like figure 4. The CPE device and the user mobile phone must use OpenEPC SIM 
card to have authentication and get connected. Different VPN types with different 
tunneling protocols can be implemented. The CPE device we are using have different 
tunneling protocols with L2TP and PPTP protocols. In this thesis our discussion will 
be limited about discussing these two types only because the VPN server we have 
used here have the capability to support these two protocols only. The other protocol 
types are hard to be compatible with being obsolete otherwise. 
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In our system, primarily we implement OpenSwan L2TP/IPSec VPN server. The 
operating system of the VPN machine was ubuntu. OpenSwan appear to be not 
compatible with ubuntu 16.04 but runs in ubuntu 14.04 and Debian OS. On the other 
hand, PPTP tunnelling protocol is obsolete over time and in most of the Linux OS do 
not support properly for which the use of PPTP in practical applications become 
limited. 
 
In our final implementation, which is a stand-alone setup where the software VPN 
(StrongSwan) is running on Debian OS, we observed this time that the IPSec is not 
working and the PPTP has similar dis-compatibility issues. The L2TP tunnel works 
perfectly by which we establish the S1 connectivity.  
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3. VPN TUNNELLING PROTOCOLS OF INTEREST 
 
3.1. VPN tunnelling Protocols 
Tunneling protocol allows a network user access and provide network service which 
is done by encapsulating a packet from one type of protocol within the datagram of a 
different protocol. For example, PPTP tunneling protocol can be used to encapsulate 
IP packets over the internet.  Depending on the requirements and capabilities of 
network devices, we can choose the tunneling protocols. There are many tunneling 
protocols such as Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP), Point to Point Tunneling 
Protocol (PPTP), Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE), Secured Socket Tunneling 
Protocol (SSTP) etc. Whereas IPSec protocol is cryptographic security services to 
protect communication over Internet Protocol (IP) to confidentiality [4]. 
 
3.2. Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol (L2TP) 
L2TP is a standard IETF VPN protocol defined by RFC2661 [5] tunneling point-to-
point protocol (PPP) session based on UDP. L2TP extends the nature of PPP. L2TP 
basically has three components. They are user PC, LAC and LNS. LAC is the L2TP 
access concentrator. In the PSTN network it accepts PPP requests coming in from the 
user PC. This is basically the gateway between the user and the LNS or the L2TP 
network server. LNS is the L2TP network server and its work is to access the 
terminating point for all the L2TP session coming in from various ways. It sees LNS 
contains basically a router, a device which acts as the terminating point for L2TP 
session. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. L2TP Structure5 
 
User establishes a PPP session to the LAC and LAC will in turn establish an 
L2TP tunnel between itself and LNS and it will tunnel all the PPP traffic to the LNS, 
which will then de-capsulate and passes that PPP traffic over the private network. 
The user is dialing out to the LAC and pass PPP credentials. PPP credentials can pass 
through PAP, CHAP or MSCHAP authentication scheme. The user locks a PPP 
session between the user and the LAC sensing its credential using PAP, CHAP or 
MSCHAP. The LAC authenticate the user and then establishes the L2TP session. 
                                                 
5 L2TP structure, DLS Reports; available at http://www.dslreports.com/forum/r30248402-ZyXel-
USG40-Multiple-IP-Ranges-for-L2TP-VPN 
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LAC authenticate the user first and then start to setup the L2TP tunnel between itself 
and LNS. L2TP has two types of messages: control and data messages. The control 
messages are used for establishing L2TP tunnels and data messages are used by data 
sessions that encapsulate PPP sessions [6], [7]. L2TP does not encrypt data stream 
hence not able to provide confidentiality for the network user. Thus, IPSec is used to 
secure L2TP packets by providing authentication, integrity and confidentiality. A 
L2TP packet structure is shown in figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Structure of an L2TP Packet Containing an IP Datagram 
 
In the figure the layers where the data can be encrypted are shown in gray color. 
Encryption of L2TP traffic with IPSec ESP is shown in figure 7. In First layer of 
L2TP encapsulation, IP datagram is wrapped with a L2TP header and a UDP header. 
In second layer encapsulation the L2TP message is wrapped with ESP (IPSec 
Encapsulation Security Payload) header, a trailer and an IPSec Authentication trailer 
to provide message integrity and authentication. Figure 7 illustrates L2TP and IPSec 
encapsulation for a PPP datagram6. 
 
Figure 7. Encryption of L2TP traffic with IPSec ESP 
 
 
3.3. L2TP Protocol Stack 
                                                 
6 VPN Tunnelling Protocols; Available at https://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/cc771298(v=ws.10).aspx  
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Figure 8. L2TP Protocol Stack [5] 
 
Fig.8 illustrate the encapsulation and stack structure for LAC and LNS. At first, 
when IPv6 packets forwarded into LAC, it is encapsulated in the PPP interface. Then 
it is passed as a user data to the L2TP protocol, where it is encapsulated as L2TP 
payload. Then it is encapsulated into a UDP packet, which is further encapsulated as 
an IPv4 packet. At this point the source address and destination address is IPv4 
address of LAC and LNS respectively. After the tunnel establishment, the network 
traffic can run in both direction between the peers [7]. 
 
3.4. IPSec Tunneling  
IPSec is a layer 3 (Network layer) protocol designed to allow data packets to be 
encrypted and encapsulated for secure transfer across an IP network. IPSec is 
composed of a set of security services. These services include access control, 
connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, protection against replays and 
encryption i.e. confidentiality. There are two traffic security protocols: authentication 
header (AH) and encapsulating security payload (ESP) plus the cryptographic key 
management procedures and protocols [8]. 
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3.4.1. Authentication Header 
Authentication Header provides data integrity and authentication of IP packets. The 
authentication procedure is based on a Message Authentication Code (MAC), which 
is encoded with a keyed hash algorithm, the result of the hash is appended to the 
packet before it is sent to the recipient.  The hash is produced from keying hash 
algorithm procedure on the data message and the common shared secret, which is 
shared between the sender and the receiver [9]. AH is supported to two different 
modes- the transport mode and tunnel mode.  In tunnel mode AH appends a new IP 
header for the whole IP packet. At the recipient end by checking the hash values the 
message integrity is confirmed, whereas SPI (Security Parameter Index) is an 
identifier for a successful connection. 
At the destination node after receiving the data packet it will regenerate the MAC 
and will compare with the MAC supplied along with AH header. If it matches then 
the destination node, send an acknowledgement (ACK) to the sender confirming that 
authentication and integrity of data has not changed. Otherwise, it will drop the 
packet and does not send ACK packet. In such case receiving no ACK, the source 
node will send data again [10]. 
 
3.4.2. IPSec Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) 
IPSec Authentication Header (AH) provides integrity, authentication between IPSec 
being capable of two nodes or devices whereas IPSec Encapsulation Security 
Payload (ESP) provides integrity and data origin authentication. ESP is used to 
enable confidentiality by encrypting the payload. There are several services 
available, depending on the nodes of operation. For example, these services can be of 
confidentiality only, for integrity only or for both confidentiality and integrity [11]. 
 
ESP is supported to operate in tunnel mode or transport mode. In the ESP tunnel 
mode, a new IP header is appended though the inner IP header stays unchanged 
whereas in transport mode the ESP header is inserted after the IP header [9]  
 
In case of ESP, in a similar way the destination node will process the ESP header. 
The intermediate malicious nodes are not able to see the data packet as the 
encapsulated data packets are encrypted with the shared key and the security 
association SA is established between the source and destination node. A new IP 
header which is outside the encapsulated packet is visible to the intermediate 
malicious node. The original IP header and data packet are encapsulated using the 
shared key between the source and destination node. The intermediate malicious 
node cannot change the data packet because of the new IP header being there, which 
is the only visible thing for it to be seen.  
When the packet reached the destination node, it is de-encapsulated using the 
shared key. After successfully decrypting the packet the destination node sends an 
ACK to the source to acknowledge that the confidentiality and authenticity has not 
broken or violated. On the other hand, if the source node doesn’t receive any ACK 
from the destination node, it will transmit the packet again [10]. 
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3.4.3. IPSec Protocol stack 
 
Figure 9. IPSec protocol stack7 
 
The figure shows the protocol stack on a client, an IPSec gateway and a server. TCP 
and HTTP are examples of higher level protocol having end to end (E2E) 
communication. Other E2E communication protocols are also supported. IPSec 
works at the Network layer of OSI model and in the IP layer of the conventional 
TCP/IP protocol stack.  
 
3.4.4. IPSec Key Exchange 
The internet Key Exchange (IKE) provides secure communication between two peers 
using IPSec protocol. Secure communication is established by creating shared 
security protocols and authentication key between IPSec end points. IKE has two 
versions: IKEv1 and IKEv2. IKEv1 works in two phases: phase 1 and phase 2. Phase 
1 operates in two modes, they are the main mode and the aggressive mode. In main 
mode, three pairs of messages are used to establish IKE SA. In aggressive mode 
three messages exchange making it faster but non-reliable. Phase 2 operates in a 
single mode called quick mode. In quick mode, three messages are exchanged to 
establish independent IPSec SAs. The messages are unidirectional, and they are 
                                                 
7IPSec Concepts; Available at https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/junose10.3/information-
products/topic-collections/swconfig-ip-services/id-91638.html 
 
 
22 
protected by IKE SA. IKEv2 is an extension of IKEv1. In IKEv2 the exchange is 
initiated by a request message to which the responder generates a response message. 
If responder does not respond with in a defined time interval, either the request is 
sent again, or the connection is terminated [9] 
 
 
3.5. Point to Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) 
A vendor consortium made up of companies like Ascend Communication, Microsoft, 
Copper Mountain Networks, 3COM and ECI Telematics developed Point to Point 
Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) to extend the capabilities and performance of Point to 
Point Protocol (PPP) which operates at Layer 2 of the OSI model. It creates a secure 
tunnel between a PPTP Access Concentrator (PAC) and the PPTP Network Server 
(PNS). In the operation mechanism, first the client uses a PPP connection to build a 
link between the source and destination through a transit network. Then using 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) session, a connection established between the 
client and the server. PPTP is used to control the establishment, management and 
release sessions through the tunnel. Every tunnel will have its own connection 
control. Finally, the PPP packets containing the original data will be sent through an 
extended version of Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) protocol, encapsulated 
into IP packets. PPTP does not support IPv6 for which it has limited use [12]. A 
PPTP frame structure is shown in figure 10. 
 
Figure 10. Structure of a PPTP Packet Containing IP Datagram 
 
The PPP frame is encrypted using MPPE (Microsoft Point to Point Encryption) 
and the encryption keys generated from MS-CHAP v2 or EAP-TLS authentication 
process. 
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3.6. PPTP Protocol Stack 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Windows95 PPTP Client/Internet/NT RAS Server Protocol Stack8 
 
To run the Windows9x PPTP client establish an IP connection with a tunnel server 
such as Windows NT Server 4.0 Remote Access Server (RAS). Windows Dial-Up 
Network uses standard PPP to provide a secure and optimized multiple protocol 
network connection over dial up telephone line. PPTP encapsulates its data stream in 
PPP protocol. PPTP is supported to Windows NT, Windows 98, Windows 95 (need 
update Dial-up Networking 1.2) and many more devices such as modems and CPE 
devices which are all supported to PPTP protocols. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Configure PPTP server behind SUA; available at: 
http://www.zyxeltech.de/SNoteZW5_362/app/pptp.html 
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4. IMPLEMENTATION AND MEASUREMENT SETUP 
 
 
Figure 12. Proposed Network Architecture 
 
In the above scenario, the diagram is implemented to facilitate the remote Pico base 
station to be connected to the OpenEPC. Here in the figure the dotted line represents 
the VPN tunneling for which it starts from CPE device and ends at the VPN server. 
The VPN server is connected to the OpenEPC through S1 AP interface. Thus, the 
remote pico base station will not have physical connection to the OpenEPC though it 
would be the part of the network. The wireless backhaul link and also the VPN 
connection will act as the backbone connection for the remote base station to be 
connected to the OpenEPC. The Pico base station operating on 2.6 GHz which is 
connected to the CPE device via a switch port and separate PC is connected to the 
switch port only to configure the CPE device. On the other side the TDD base station 
operating on 3.5 GHz frequency has the wireless backhaul link connection to the 
CPE device. Thus, the Pico base station will be able to establish S1 connectivity to 
the OpenEPC through the wireless backhaul link and through the VPN server. The 
OpenEPC is already implemented in the VMWare workstation where five virtual 
machines are up and running which are client_UE, EnodeB, SPGW, MME and 
EPC_Enabler. The VPN server would be installed in the sixth virtual machine which 
would be integrated with the other virtual machines. Certain topology would be 
deployed to accomplish the connection between the VPN server and the other virtual 
machines. 
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4.1. Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) 
The CPE device we are using here is Gemtek model namely WLTFQM-136ACN, 
LTE B42_43 Cat 6 Single Mode CPE device. The device is supported to LTE band 
42 (3,400-3600 MHz). It has IPv4, IPv6 features; It can be operated in NAT mode, 
Bridge mode, Tunnel mode (GRE, L2TP/L2TP with IPSec, PPTP) or Router mode. 
It has the feature of DHCP server for IP allocation for the users up to maximum 253 
clients supportable.  
 
SCTP wireless protocol is needed for S1 connectivity without tunneling. The CPE 
device is not supported to SCTP wireless protocols and do not support most of the 
common tunneling protocols except L2TP and PPTP tunneling protocols. L2TP 
protocol do not provide any security encryption itself but it can be used with IPSec. 
Whereas PPTP tunneling protocols have some limitations for having low security 
standards and lower performance on unstable connections.  
 
The IP Security tunneling is needed to be created starting from the CPE device 
and ends to the VPN Server. Thus, in such scenario the CPE device will be operated 
in tunnel mode with L2TP tunneling protocol and on the other end the VPN Server 
will be configured for L2TP tunneling with IPSec protocol.   
 
The VPN server tunneling protocol need to be matched with the tunneling 
protocol which we have defined in the CPE device configuration. We found a 
software VPN named SoftetherVPN which has configurability to use L2TP tunneling 
protocol along with IPSec. 
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4.2. SoftEther VPN Server 
SoftEther VPN is a powerful VPN software developed by University of Tsukuba, 
Japan. The VPN software is open source9 and easy to establish remote access and site 
to site VPN. It uses the AES 256-bit and RSA 4096- with encryption to provide 
sufficient security features such as logging and firewall inner VPN tunnel. The VPN 
Server runs on Windows, Linus, FreeBSD, Solaris and Mac OS X. It is supported to 
both IPv4/IPv6 dual stack and configurable to all settings on GUI. It has 1Gbps high 
speed throughput performance with low memory and CPU usage. It is supported to 
SSL-VPN (HTTPS) and six major VPN protocols (OpenVPN, IPSec, L2TP, MS-
SSTP, L2TPv3 and EtherIP) are all supported to VPN tunneling. Android mobiles, 
iPhones, iPad, Android Tabs, Mac OSX and windows mobiles are compatible for 
OpenVPN protocols (IP over TCP/UDP) and L2TP/IPSec VPN protocol (L2TP over 
IPSec) whereas Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 8 are compatible to MS-
SSTP VPN protocol (PPP over HTTPS), SoftEther VPN protocol (Ethernet over 
HTTPS) and L2TP/IPSec VPN protocol (L2TP over IPSec). On the other hand, 
Linux operating system is compatible for OpenVPN protocols, SoftEther VPN 
protocols and L2TP/IPSec protocols. Cisco routers or other vendor’s L2TPv3 or 
EtherIP compatible routers can also connect to the L2TP/IPSec SoftEther VPN 
server. The hardware requirements to run the L2TP SoftEther VPN server is also 
considerably low. Normally only 2Gbytes of free space in hard drive and very 
minimal RAM specification is required for the VPN server. On the other hand, for 
the SoftEther VPN client requirement only 32 Mbytes of RAM is required. 
 
The SoftEther VPN server, namely “vpn5G” is installed in a virtual machine 
having Linux operating system. The other five virtual machines (Client UE, EnodeB, 
SPGW, MME and EPC_Enablers) are already installed in the OpenEPC platform 
created in VMWare vSphere ESXi Server, which is already up and running on 
arina2. Certain topology will be created to connect the vpn5G to the other connecting 
virtual machines.  
 
 
                                                 
9 SoftEther VPN Open Source; Available at https://www.softether.org/ 
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Figure 13. Virtual Machines (VM) in the network 
 
For only security purpose the virtual machine vpn5G only connected to PanOulu 
and other interfaces which connects to 5GvLAN is disabled, for instance. It is 
because if all the virtual machines operate in the same network then any 
configuration change in the vpn5G for any test purpose or for some experiments can 
in turn change the configuration and topological change, for the other virtual 
machine may become some technical risks. When the VPN software is fully 
functional with its configuration, we can easily then connect vpn5G virtual machine 
to the other virtual machines or even we can clone all the virtual machines including 
vpn5G and then integrate them together for further measurement and analysis. 
To implement such a setup with the vpn5G and the OpenEPC it would be more 
pragmatic to achieve it step by step implementation where in every step there would 
be opportunity to deal with the bottlenecks and finding solution and thus continue for 
further approach to the final implementation. So, we performed the following tests to 
check and reach the realistic implementation of the final configuration. 
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4.3. Tunneling between the server and the CPE device 
The test is carried out to check if it is possible to create a tunnel between the server 
and the CPE device. For this we have used two CPE router which are both connected 
to the TDD base station as given in the figure below: 
 
Figure 14. Tunneling between layer2tp.softether server and the CPE2 device 
 
The TDD base station is wirelessly connected with two CPE routers. One CPE is 
operating on Bridge mode and the other operating on Tunnel mode. The IP address 
for the bridged CPE1 device is 10.92.148.36 and CPE2 10.92.148.22 which is 
operating in Tunnel mode.  The tunneling has been done between CPE2 and the 
layer2tp.softether.net server (IP: 185.38.2.4) which is running on a PC, whose IP 
address is 192.168.15.217. Thus, we are operating CPE1 in bridge mode so that we 
can ignore CPE1 when we are considering the tunnel between the 
layer2tp.softether.net server and the CPE2 device. PC2 is connected to the CPE2 
device only to configure the CPE device to operate in tunnel mode with other 
settings and configurations.  
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Figure 15.layer2tp.softether.net Server installed in PC1 
 
The VPN Server has been built in dynamic DNS function so that in the software 
we can customize the name of the VPN server by changing the dynamic DNS 
hostname. The following figure is the block diagram representation of the figure 1. 
Here the VPN server IP address is 185.38.2.4 which is installed in a computer whose 
IP address is 192.168.15.217. The dotted line represents both the CPE devices 
wirelessly connected to the TDD base station.  
 
4.3.1. layer2tp.softether.net server settings and configuration 
 
Figure 16. Block diagram representation. 
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4.3.2.  CPE1 and CPE 2 Configuration 
The CPE device, a wireless router can be connected to the PC with LAN cable or be 
wirelessly configured. The configuration setup for the CPE device is simple and user 
friendly. By providing the IP address (192.168.15.1) and the default user’s name and 
password, it is easy to go to the settings and configure back and forth.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. CPE 1 WAN Setup 
 
The CPE1 device name is Generic_91E9E3. The WAN IP address of the device is 
10.92.148.3. We have configured CPE1 to operate in bridge mode. The WAN MTU 
is 1400 and connection mode is here given as DHCP.  
 
Figure 18. CPE 2 WAN Setup 
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The CPE2 device name is Generic_91EAA3. The WAN IP address is 
10.92.148.28. In the WAN settings we have changed the connection mode be DHCP, 
VPN type as L2TP, supporting NAT have also been configured as CPE2 device to 
operate in Tunnel mode and the default gateway interface is here given as tunnel.  
We have given the L2TP server name as the same as has been created in the PC1 
which was layer2tp.softether.net. In the L2TP user we have given one of the user’s 
name which we have created in the server in PC1.  Here in the settings we provide 
the IPSec L2TP key as “VPN” which was the same IPSec pre-shared key that we had 
provided while configuring the VPN server.  
We have configured the CPE2 to operate in tunnel mode, acting as a client. So, we 
can easily check the connectivity by pinging from the client to the 
layer2tp.softether.net server and vice versa. From the CPE device diagnostic tool 
interface, we can perform the ping test and trace route.  
 
Figure 19. Ping to Server 
 
The above ping test result is found when we ping to the Server from CPE2. Here 
it is noticeable that the delay is high i.e. 61.605 ms, 56.740 ms and so on.  
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Figure 20. Trace Route to the Server 
 
Thus, the CPE device and the VPN server can be peered to send and receive 
traffic. From the Client end CPE 2, we can also ping to the Server on its Global IPv4 
or Global IPv6 address instead of pinging to the Server name. Similarly, from server 
end we can ping to the tunnel end i.e. CPE 2. If we need to check end to end 
connectivity from the Server end to the end device PC2, then we need to install 
Software VPN client on PC2 so that it can communicate with the server. So, we have 
established IPSec\L2TP tunneling and passed traffic through the tunnel i.e. from the 
CPE device to the layer2tp.softetherVPN server in figure 14. 
 
4.4. Tunneling between the PC(client) and the server 
 
Figure 21. Tunneling between client PC and server on the virtual machine 
 
In this arrangement tunneling is configured between the PC(client) and the SoftEther 
VPN server running it in virtual machine. The SoftEther VPN server is installed in 
PC running windows server 2012 R2 and the client is configured in a PC which 
connects with LAN cable. Thus, the server PC and the PC client both are on the 
5GVLAN. The server PC IP is 193.166.28.10 and the client PC IP is 193.166.28.56. 
The server’s name is: vpn924935333.softether.net. Global IPv4 address: 185.38.2.3. 
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We are performing this test to confirm that if we can configure the VPN software in 
the cloud then we can try to make connectivity from the client. 
 
Figure 22. Dynamic DNS Hostname of the Server 
 
This time, we have changed the DNS hostname to vpn924935333.softether.net. 
The VPN server has both IPv4 and IPv6 addressing which are 185.38.2.3 and 
2a00:1d50:3:452:c4dc:3642:3dcf:54c4 respectively.  
 
 
Figure 23. Creating users in the server 
 
We have created users in the server. From the client PC the users can connect to 
the server. From the client PC, any user between these two users can connect and 
access the VPN server by providing username and corresponding password.  
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Figure 24. Client tunneling configuration 
 
In the client PC, we have configured the client with layer 2 tunneling protocol 
with IPSec from the created VPN connection properties. The same secret key need to 
provide in both VPN server and client to have successful connection between the 
server and the client.  
 
After successfully connecting the client PC with the server 
vpn924935333.softether.net, we have performed ping test from the client PC to the 
vpn924935333.softether.net server.  
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       Figure 25. Ping to the server vpn924935333.softether.net 
 
    Figure 26. Trace route to the server vpn924935333.softether.net 
 
We have also performed the trace route to the server vpn924935333.softether.net 
from the client PC.  
We can also perform ping or trace route to the global IPv4 address of the server. 
For example, we can ping to the global address 185.38.2.3, which is the Global IPv4 
address of the server. 
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Figure 27. Ping to the server Global IPv4 address 
 
Thus, on a virtual machine running Windows server 2012 R2, we have performed 
tunneling and data transfer between the Server (vpn924935333.softether.net) and the 
client PC. 
 
4.5. Tunneling between the CPE device and VPN software 
 
Figure 28. Tunnelling between the CPE device and virtual machine 
  
In this arrangement the tunneling is configured between the CPE device and the VPN 
software which is running on a virtual machine. Now we can also test the above 
topology to see if we can connect the CPE device to the SoftEther server which is 
running on a virtual machine. Here this topology CPE device is connected to a PC, 
which is running windows server 2012 R2. The CPE device and the server PC both 
are connected on the 5GVLAN. The VPN software vpn924935333.softether.net is 
installed in the windows server R2 server PC. Another PC is connected to the CPE 
device only to configure the CPE device.  
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Figure 29. Dynamic hostname of the VPN Server 
 
The VPN server is given the name as vpn924935333.softether.net. The Global 
IPv4 and Global IPv6 addresses are 185.38.2.3 and 
2a00:1d50:3:452:c4dc:3642:3dcf:54c4 respectively.  
 
Figure 30. The WAN Settings of the CPE device 
 
In the CPE device configuration settings, we have changed the WAN settings, 
LAN settings and other corresponding settings to operate the device in tunnel mode. 
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As we have configured before we changed the operating mode to tunnel mode, VPN 
type L2TP, enabling NAT support, default gateway interface as tunnel. We have 
provided L2TP server name, L2TP user name and password as also IPSec secret key 
in the WAN settings. Thus, the CPE device will act as a client to the VPN server. 
 
       Figure 31. Ping test to the Server vpn924935333.softether.net  
 
From the diagnostic tool interface, we have performed the ping test to the 
vpn924935333.softether.net server from the client. The packet size is 56 bytes. As 
we have observed the delay is much higher than usual.   
 
        Figure 32. Trace route to the Server vpn924935333.softether.net  
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To observe the breakdown of delay, we can execute the trace route command 
from the client to the vpn924935333.softether.net server. 
Figure 33. Ping to the server’s global address 185.38.2.3 1 
 
We can also directly ping from the client to the destination VPN servers Global 
IPv4 address which is 185.38.2.3. Pinging to the server’s name or pinging to the 
servers IP address is identical giving the same result. So, After the tunnel 
establishment we have successfully performed the ping and trace route test from the 
CPE device to the destination server address. 
 
 
4.6. Openswan VPN Server 
Openswan has been VPN (Virtual Private Network) software for the Linux 
community since 2005. It has the support for the extensions RFC (Request for 
comments) and IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) related to IPSec, including 
IKEv2, X.509 digital certificates, NAT traversal and many more. Fedora, Red Hat, 
Debian, Gentoo and many more systems already include the distribution. It is even 
easy to install by downloading the software directly from the source code. Openswan 
VPN is much flexible for the users to make changes of the parameters and options to 
define user’s requirements.  Openswan supports SSTP, IPSec, L2TP, L2TPv3, PPTP, 
Split tunneling and SSL/TSL communication protocols10.  
 
In our system we are using CPE as the client and Openswan as the VPN server. 
Thus, the client CPE and the VPN server must be compatible with the same 
protocols. Our CPE device is compatible to L2TP/IPSec and PPTP transport 
protocols. SoftEther VPN for Linux is also available to be installed. In this thesis we 
have chosen Openswan in some implementation cases because it is easier to 
                                                 
10 Welcome to Openswan: Website available at https://www.openswan.org/ 
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implement, finding customer support, fault detection and flexibility in 
implementation [13]. 
 
 
4.7. Tunneling between PC (client) and L2TP/IPSec Openswan VPN 
 
Figure 34. Tunneling between PC as client and L2TP/IPSec VPN Server 
 
In the server configuration, the tunneling is configured between PC (client) and 
L2TP/IPSec Openswan VPN running in a virtual machine “vpn5g”. The client IP 
address is defined from 172.16.20.30-172.16.20.100 and the local IP address of the 
server 172.16.20.1. After tunnel establishment the client PC has the PPP adapter 
VPN connection with the IP address 172.16.20.30.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35. PPP adapter VPN connection between client and server 
 
The VPN connection status can also be viewed from ‘VPN connection status’ of 
the client windows PC or it can be viewed from the terminal of Linux terminal of the 
server. By executing the command ‘/etc/init.d/ipsec status’ from the Linux command 
line, we can view the number of active established tunnels.   
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   Figure 36. VPN Connection status from Client PC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37. IPSec Status of the L2TP/IPSec server 
 
Clients can simultaneously connect to the server. For example, an android phone 
is connected to the server. The client android phone is assigned to an IP address 
172.16.20.31 from the server. In the server side the defined IP range for the clients is 
172.16.20.30-172.16.20.100.   
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Figure 38. PP0 and PP1 VPN connection between client and server 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39. L2TP/IPSec VPN connection between Android client and server 
 
To verify multiple tunnel establishments, we have used an Android phone and one 
PC as the clients to connect to the server. Figures 38 and 39 shows two point to point 
connections PPP0 and PPP1 and successful establishment of two tunnels. For every 
successful IPSec Security tunnel establishment, IPSec SA (Security Association) 
needs to be established in transport mode. In Linux command line by executing ‘tail 
–f /var/log/auth.log/auth’, we can inspect the steps of a successful IPSec SA 
establishment. 
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Figure 40. IPSec Status of the L2TP/IPSec server 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41. IPSec SA established 
 
Figure 41 shows the IPSec SA establishment in tunnel mode in the log file. After 
successful tunnel establishment “IPSec SA established transport mode” indicates the 
final confirmation.  
 
 
4.8. Tunnelling between PC (client) and PPTP Openswan VPN 
 
Figure 42. Tunnelling between the PC (Client) and PPTP VPN server 
 
 
 
44 
In this arrangement the tunneling is configured between PC (client) and PPTP 
Openswan VPN running in virtual machine vpn5g. In the PPTP VPN server 
configuration, client IP address is defined from IP 192.168.1.1-192.168.1.100 and the 
local IP address is defined as 192.168.0.1. Figure 43 and 44 show the successful 
point to point VPN connection status from the client PC and the server respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43. VPN Connection status from Client PC 
 
Figure 44. Point to point VPN connection between client and server 
 
The server successfully is point to point connected to the client 192.168.1.1. From 
the Linux command line, by executing the command ‘/etc/init.d/pptpd status’ we can 
check the status of the PPTP server. Figure 45 shows that the PPTP server is up and 
running. 
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Figure 45. PPTP Server status 
 
 
4.9. Tunnelling between CPE (client) and L2TP/IPSec Openswan VPN 
 
 
Figure 46. Tunnelling between the CPE (client) and L2TP/IPSec VPN 
 
In the above arrangement, the L2TP/IPSec VPN tunnelling is configured between the 
CPE and the Openswan VPN running in virtual machine “vpn5g”.  The configuration 
for the CPE device to work as a client, we have changed the WAN setting as 
following:  
 
Figure 47. CPE device WAN settings for L2TP VPN tunnel mode 
 
The VPN IP address is 10.20.196.230. In the server settings we have created a 
user “student” with password. In the Client CPE configuration, we have also given 
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the username and corresponding password accordingly. The CPE device has a built 
in Host name for the device i.e. “Generic_3B7DD”.  
Figure 48. Ping test from CPE (client) device 
 
We have successfully pinged to the server from the CPE device. We have used the 
diagnostic tools of the CPE device to execute the ping command. It is observed that 
the delay is significantly high. 
 
Figure 49. Traceroute to the server from CPE device 
 
We have also performed traceroute to the server from the client CPE device. It is 
also observed that the delay is also significantly high. We can check for the system 
log by executing the command ‘tail/ -f /var/log/syslog’ in the command line. 
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Figure 50. System log information 
 
The ping command from the CPE device can also be traced from Wireshark 
packet analyser tool. The IP address for the CPE device and the L2TP/IPSec server is 
10.20.208.163 and 10.20.196.230 respectively. By filtering ICMP files we can trace 
the source and destination of the traced file. 
 
 
Figure 51. Wireshark trace for the ping request 
 
 
4.10. Tunnelling between CPE (client) and PPTP Openswan VPN 
Figure 52. Tunnelling between the CPE (client) and PPTP VPN server 
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In this configuration the PPTP (point to point tunnelling protocol) is used in the VPN 
server, while the CPE working as a client. In the client CPE configuration, we have 
changed the PPTP username and password accordingly. Similarly, like L2TP server, 
we have changed settings for PPTP VPN type. The PPTP Server IP address is 
10.20.196.230. The PPTP client CPE WAN configuration is as follows: 
 
Figure 53. CPE device WAN settings for PPTP VPN tunnel mode 
 
 
Figure 54. Ping test from CPE (client) device 
 
We have executed ping command from the client CPE to the PPTP VPN server. It 
is also observed that the delay is significantly high. 
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Figure 55. Traceroute to the server from CPE device 
 
We have also executed the traceroute command from the client CPE to the PPTP 
server IP address. It is also observed that the delay is significantly high. 
 
 
4.11. StrongSwan VPN Server 
StrongSwan VPN is the IPSec implementation which runs on Linux 2.6, 3.x and 4.x 
kernels, Android, FreeBSD, OS X, iOS and windows. It’s the open source IPSec 
based VPN solution which can be implemented for both IKEv1 and IKEv2 key 
exchange protocols. StrongSwan is supported to IPv6 IPSec tunnel, dynamic IP 
address allocation and interface update, NAT- Traversal via UDP encapsulation and 
port floating, dead peer detection etc. The virtual IP address pool is managed by IKE 
daemon/SQL database. It has secure IKEv2 EAP user authentication, supported to 
EAP-RADIUS plugin and IKEv2 multiple authentication exchange. The 
authentication procedure is based on X.509 certificates or pre-shared keys11 
LibreSwan is a fork of OpenSwan. FreeSwan project is the mother/origin of the 
both strongSwan and LibreSwan. OpenSwan or LibreSwan is much similar or close 
to the origin where as StrongSwan is a complete reimplementation in some criteria.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 StrongSwan VPN server configuration details available at https://www.strongswan.org/ 
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4.12. Tunnelling between CPE(Client) and L2TP VPN Server 
 
 
Figure 56. Stand-alone architecture of the setup 
 
The standalone setup implementation of the network is shown in the above figure 56.  
In the setup CPE device is configured to operate in tunnel mode. OpenEPC SIM card 
is used in both CPE device and UE. The ‘vpn5g’ virtual machine along with the 
other virtual machines are running on top of hypervisor which is the Vmware 
workstation installed on the host computer. StrongSwan L2TP IPSec VPN is 
installed in the VM ‘vpn5g’. The WAN settings of the CPE is shown in the following 
figure 57. The IPSec secret and other operational mode settings are provided to the 
CPE device settings. We have given a static IP to the CPE and Pico LAN interfaces 
initially which are 192.168.200.100 and 192.168.200.150 respectively to bring the 
devices in the same network. In the Pico base station settings, we define CPE device 
as the gateway for the Pico to enable successful traffic from the Pico to OpenEPC. 
The Pico base station is operating on 2.6 GHz and the TDD base station on 3.5 GHz 
frequency.  In the VPN server configuration, we have configured the local IP address 
for the server as 192.168.4.15 and the client range is defined as 192.168.4.16-17. 
 
In the host computer we have used two ethernet ports. One port is bridged to the 
TDD base station and the other is bridged with the 5GvLAN. The host IP interface of 
5GvLAN is 193.166.28.150. The host computer is connected to the internet via 
5GvLAN. All the OpenEPC virtual machines/nodes i.e. EPC-enablers, MME, SPGW 
etc along with ‘vpn5g’ are running on the Vmware workstation which is running on 
the host computer. The VPN VM has interface with an IP 193.166.28.151 on the 
5GvLAN IP pool. This IP 193.166.28.151 is the external IP address for the VPN 
machine. 
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The CPE, working as a client having the LAN IP 192.168.200.100 is paired with 
the VPN server whose external IP address is 193.166.28.151. The CPE WAN 
settings are given in the following figure 57. 
 
Figure 57. WAN settings of the CPE device 
 
The CPE and the VPN server are given the same user name and password for 
authentication. The layer 2 tunneling protocol request reaches the external IP of the 
VPN server. All necessary settings along with Unix authentication is required in the 
VPN server. In the VPN server settings, we have defined the client IP range as 
192.168.4.16-17 and the local IP address of the VPN server as 192.168.4.15. In the 
VPN server, the DNS IP 4.2.2.1, we have used chap authentication in both client and 
server machines. The details of the configurations are included in the appendix 
section. 
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Figure 58. PPP0 established in L2TP tunnel mode 
 
The CPE has successfully been attached to the core network. From the CPE 
diagnostic tool, we can ping successfully to the MME IP 192.168.4.80 and to the 
google DNS 8.8.8.8. To accomplish this connectivity, we have imposed a SNAT rule 
on the iptables of the VPN machine. The WAN IP of the VPN machine is 
192.168.3.151 
 
Figure 59. Base station attachment procedure 
 
The pico base station, having the gateway IP 192.168.200.100 (CPE), is 
successfully attached to the network. The attachment procedure messages are shown 
in the figure 59. From the command line “mme.enb.print” we can view the details of 
both the base stations. The TDD base station IP address is 192.168.4.7 and the pico 
baco base station IP address is 192.168.4.16.  
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Figure 60. Connectivity test from pico base station to 8.8.8.8 
 
From the pico base station terminal we can successfully check the connectivity to 
MME (192.168.4.80) and to the google dns 8.8.8.8 and 4.2.2.1 for internet 
connectivity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 61. Pico base-station on Air 
 
To make the pico base station reachable, it was required to give “IP forwarding” 
commands in the VPN machine. The local IP address of the pico base station is 
192.168.200.150. In the pico base station configuration, we have given the gateway 
is the CPE device i.e 192.168.200.100 rather than MME IP address for other usual 
cases.  
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Figure 62. SPGW binding information 
 
    The pico base station attached with the network. From the Nokia BTS site 
manager tool, we can check the state of BTS, available alarm, local IP and other 
network configurations. The binding messages are generated and can be viewed for 
detailed information. The base station needs to be synchronized for successfully 
going to “On Air”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 63. rmnet0 interface up in UE 
 
According to the openEPC configuration settings, UE is expected to have an IP on 
the nat_c IP pool i.e 192.168.3. x. In figure 63, the UE is successfully assigned to an 
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IP on the nat_c IP pool. According to LTE assignment, the UE gets the IP 
192.168.3.104 on the rmnet0 interface.  
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
The future of cellular communication is assumed to be the integration of huge 
number of connecting devices with very high throughput capabilities. Researchers all 
around the world are working to meet the requirements. All the efforts, extensive 
measurements and research initiatives are imposed in the research and development 
of different industries, institutes and research body of academia are working side by 
side with a common aim to materialize the speculations to bring them into reality. In 
general, 5G technology must be more efficient, stable, more scalable and compatible 
platform to integrate all previous technologies. 5G technology is expected to have 
huge devices, IOT and sensors connected in the network. In most of the cases, the 
connections are by wireless which is expected in future cellular technology.  
 
As IPv4 addresses are being exhausted researchers implement IPv6 on carrier 
network. IETF has proposed several technologies for smooth transition from IPv4 to 
IPv6. These technologies can be divided in three types: Dual stack, tunnelling and 
translation. In dual stack technology IPv4 and IPv6 protocol stacks are implemented 
in both hosts and routers so that host can use either one of IPv4 or IPv6 addresses to 
access the outside networks. In tunnelling technology, the most important part lies on 
the encapsulation and decapsulation of IPv4 and IPv6 packets according to network 
types. The solution can be discussed on two different scenarios. In first scenario, it is 
possible to implement L2TP 6in4 gateway mode or L2TP 6in4 host mode. In L2TP 
6in4 gateway mode, host in an IPv4 LAN need to access IPv6 network through a 
gateway where as in L2TP 6in4 host mode a host in IPv4 network wants to access 
IPv6 network directly. In this 6in4 host mode the host acts as LAC. In second 
scenario we can implement L2TP 4in6 gateway mode or L2TP 4in6 host mode. In 
L2TP 4in6 gateway mode hosts in an IPv6 internet can access IPv4 network through 
LAC acted as gateway whereas in L2TP 4in6 host mode a host in IPv6 only network 
wants to access the IPv4 only network directly. Here the host of the L2TP 4in6 host 
mode acts as a LAC [14]. 
 
L2TP protocol is used on authentication security of WAN. Authentication and 
reliability of transmission can be improved by using a double-sided authentication 
and similarity mppe encryption. WLAN security authentication has WEP, WPA and 
802.1x pattern.  
WEP pattern has few security vulnerabilities WPA pattern an authentication mode 
of 802.11 standards has two ways: i. pre-shared key pattern and ii. Authentication 
key publication manner IEEE 802.1x. WPA manner strengthened the algorithm of 
encryption key, adding features to prevent data from tempering and certification 
function. WPA pattern has drawbacks such as lack of authentication from tempering 
on the half way, not resisting the generalized packets and complicate configuration. 
802.1x authentication relies on Extensible Authentication protocol EAP. The 
authentication mechanism requires a dedicated RADIUS server, relatively high 
installation and maintain cost. It has drawbacks such as lack of integrity protection 
and data encryption while transmission, possibility of man in the middle attack, 
session hijacking and denial of service attack. Double-sided L2TP protocol 
authentication method has four times handshake mechanism MS-CHAPv2 is 
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considered as most appropriate for authentication of link layer tunnel technology. 
The encryption method achieved same efficiency of ppp encryption in L2TP. An 
enhancement in the reliability transmission accomplished since every packet contains 
the identity information of LAC, LNS and hidden authentication.  
 
L2TP provide error and flow control and the use of ppp level data encryption for 
the data security and encryption. The data security can be further enhanced by 
adopting other encryption technologies combined with the L2TP. Examples of such 
encryption technologies are SSH, SSL, IPSec etc increase the delay no more than 
2ms and capable of debugging in Linux systems [15].   
 
As an example, we can consider a scenario where a network consists of main 
campus and several remote networks. The main campus is connected to the remote 
networks with VPN technology. IPSec VPN technology considered to be more 
suitable for remote multi-campus remote interconnection, while L2TP VPN is more 
suitable for mobile users using remote connection. To achieve more secured and 
complete remote experience, mobile users can utilize L2TP over IPSec VPN to 
connect the main campus while having data encryption and enhanced security. To 
enhance more security firewall can be deployed to the main campus network to 
achieve safe interconnection between the main campus and the sub campus. IPSec 
VPN, L2TP over IPSec VPN and firewall technology can be deployed for improved 
experience for the remote access users to the main campus. Successful 
implementation of such kind of network can be utilized in colleges, universities and 
enterprises for secure band complete access experience [16]. 
 
For the continuous growing need of the user for more data speed and connectivity 
without substantial financial investment, NFV and SDN has become the only 
solution for future cellular communication. NFV based solution comprises of 
software modules of the core network functions. These software modules are running 
on separate virtual machines on private cloud or cloud owned by companies for 
example amazon.com. NFV has virtualized core network components running on 
virtual machines in the data centres.  On the other hand, SDN based solution has the 
SDN controller where the control function runs as applications. Here the control 
plane consists of one or more controllers which is considered as the brain of the SDN 
network [17]. 
 
My thesis includes connecting a base station wirelessly to the core (OpenEPC) by 
using a opensource VPN software. The LTE wireless backhaul is used to achieve the 
S1 connection to the core network. Normally we cannot make a S1 connection within 
another S1 connection. The introduction of the VPN solved the issue in a way that 
the packets come from the Pico encapsulated in the CPE(client) device then using the 
wireless 3.5 GHz LTE link of TDD base station, finding the gateway of OpenEPC 
(spgw) coming to the interface of the VPN machine. In the VPN machine the packets 
get de-encapsulated. The VPN has its connectivity to the other VM’s of the 
OpenEPC. Thus, it appears as a separate base-station traffic coming to the core 
network. (Figure 56). The procedure makes possible the S1 connection over the air 
interface. 
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5GTN is a testbed for all research group to come up with ideas and implement 
their innovative thinking bringing them into reality. In my thesis work, primarily we 
have planned to use L2TP and PPTP tunnelling protocol to create the tunnel by 
which the traffic can pass through. We have tried to reach our goal step by step, 
solving the bottlenecks in every stage of the implementation. As we have discussed 
earlier, we ended up deciding that the implementation would be a stand-alone setup 
(Figure 56). 
 
Stand-alone setup bring ease in creating the network interfaces. The OpenEPC 
developed by CND (Core Network Dynamics) do not have the repository to create a 
separate VM with the required interfaces. To overcome the problem, we have 
manually created a VM “vpn5g” and the required interfaces to connect with the other 
nodes of OpenEPC. 
 
At the present scope of implementation, the CPE(client) must be in the coverage 
of the TDD base station. This constraint can be avoided if we configure a global 
server (http server) and replace the existing local server. Using the global server, we 
can connect the pico base station from anywhere and within any network ambience. 
This modification of work would be the future go of the future thesis. 
 
In stand-alone implementation, we have used L2TP tunnelling protocol to 
establish the tunnel. In extension of this work, we can implement the same setup 
using PPTP and GRE tunnelling protocol and check for the performance in every 
case.  
 
In our implementation, we have only used one single pico base station. We can 
extend this implementation by connecting several base stations (Figure 3) and 
evaluate the network behaviour, looking for any performance drops, abnormalities as 
well as evaluating all performance metrics end to end all the way. 
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6. SUMMARY 
 
For the growing need of coverage and capacity higher frequencies are going to 
utilized for communication. The cell size would be reduced in size and increased in 
number. To deploy and achieve such infrastructure with wired backhaul is expensive 
and tiresome work for some distant remote location. Therefore, the deployment of 
wireless backhaul can be a good option for network operators to deliver coverage and 
capacity for high subscriber density areas with reduced cost. Wireless backhaul 
optimization, performance and scalability will be on the critical path on such cellular 
system deployment. We have used a software VPN to connect a pico base station 
using wireless backhaul. The network is using 3.5 GHz wireless link instead of LAN 
wire for backhaul link between the EnodeB and the core network (OpenEPC). LTE 
TDD band 42 acting as a wireless backhaul (Link between EnodeB and band 42 CPE 
router). The VPN tunnel status, UE attachment procedure, CPE router attachment 
procedure and data packets are traced using Wireshark at different nodes of network. 
We have tried to implement the whole setup step by step towards the final standalone 
setup. The standalone setup (Fig.56) having a number of virtual machines with 
LINUX OS to run the network instances of OpenEPC. The implementation and 
bottlenecks are documented in this thesis work. Connecting a base station using VPN 
technology gives the mobility for the BS to provide coverage and capacity to remote 
distant locations. This plug and play use of network device brings easy and mobile 
use of base stations.  The extension of this work can be done using a global VPN so 
that the CPE acting as a client can connect to the server from anywhere to establish 
the tunnel. The pico base station which is connected to the CPE through ethernet port 
can pass through the tunnel to reach MME for authentication. 
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8. APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. ipsec.conf file configuration 
 
config setup 
    cachecrls=yes 
    uniqueids=yes 
    charondebug="" 
 
conn %default 
    keyingtries=%forever 
    dpddelay=30s 
    dpdtimeout=120s 
 
conn L2TP 
    left=193.166.28.151 
    leftprotoport=17/%any 
    rightprotoport=17/%any 
    right=%any 
    authby=secret 
    ikelifetime=1h 
    keylife=8h 
    ike=aes128-sha1-modp1536,aes128-sha1-modp1024,aes128-md5-
modp1536,aes128-md5-modp1024,3des-sha1-modp1536,3des-sha1-modp1024,3des-
md5-modp1536,3des-md5-modp1024 
    esp=aes128-sha1-modp1536,aes128-sha1-modp1024,aes128-md5-
modp1536,aes128-md5-modp1024,3des-sha1-modp1536,3des-sha1-modp1024,3des-
md5-modp1536,3des-md5-modp1024 
    auto=add 
    keyexchange=ike 
    type=tunnel 
 
 
Appendix 2. ipsec.secrets file configuration 
 
# This file holds shared secrets or RSA private keys for authentication. 
 
# RSA private key for this host, authenticating it to any other host 
# which knows the public part.  Suitable public keys, for ipsec.conf, DNS, 
# or configuration of other implementations, can be extracted conveniently 
# with "ipsec showhostkey". 
 
193.166.28.151 %any : PSK "123456" 
 
Appendix 3. xl2tpd.conf file configuration 
 
[global] 
ipsec saref = no 
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debug tunnel = no 
debug avp = no 
debug network = no 
debug state = no 
 
[lns default] 
ip range = 192.168.4.16-192.168.4.17 
local ip = 192.168.4.15 
require authentication = yes 
name = l2tp 
pass peer = yes 
ppp debug = no 
pppoptfile = /etc/ppp/options.xl2tpd 
length bit = yes 
unix authentication = yes 
 
Appendix 4. l2tp.secrets file configuration 
 
# Secrets for authenticating l2tp tunnels 
# us    them    secret 
# *     *       interop 
*      *       123456 
 
Appendix 5. options.xl2tpd file configuration 
 
ipcp-accept-local 
ipcp-accept-remote 
ms-dns 4.2.2.1 
ms-dns 4.2.2.2 
auth 
idle 1800 
mtu 1200 
mru 1200 
nodefaultroute 
lock 
proxyarp 
connect-delay 5000 
name l2tp 
login 
refuse-pap 
refuse-chap 
refuse-mschap 
require-mschap-v2 
 
Appendix 6. chap-secrets file configuration 
 
# Secrets for authentication using CHAP 
# client        server  secret                  IP addresses 
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#masum    *   "masum04"  * 
munim    l2tp   "1234asd"  * 
 
Appendix 7. Iptables rules in VPN machine 
 
Chain POSTROUTING (policy ACCEPT 55 packets, 5853 bytes) 
 pkts bytes target     prot opt in     out     source               destination          
   30  2188 SNAT       all  --  *      eth0    192.168.4.16         0.0.0.0/0            
to:192.168.254.132 
 
 
 
 
